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Canadian military historians generally accept that during the First World War the Canadian 
military improved over time. This idea of a 
“learning curve” suggests that Canadians began 
the war as inexperienced colonial volunteers and, 
as the Corps gained experience on the battlefield, 
commanders and ordinary soldiers alike learned 
from their mistakes and successes and improved 
combat tactics from battle to battle and from 
year to year.1  Several different approaches to 
this argument are evident in the literature. Tim 
Cook and Bill Rawling both published works in 
the mid-1990s that argue technology was the 
impetus behind this process of learning.  On the 
other hand, Shane Schreiber, James McWilliams 
and R. James Steel have focused on what they 
see as the ultimate success of the learning curve: 
the August 1918 Battle of Amiens.2  However, 
while technology played an important role in the 
conduct of the war, and the Battle of Amiens was 
indeed a significant Allied victory, one question 
remains: where is the hard evidence that this 
learning curve exists?
One of the best ways to find evidence of 
“learning,” a largely abstract process, is through 
an examination of training. Because training 
is meant to impart specific knowledge, during 
the Great War written training instructions and 
orders were spelled out in minute and explicit 
detail and the lessons that were to be learned 
from various exercises were highlighted. 
 While many excellent works have been 
produced on the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
there is still room for further scholarship. Until 
recently, training has been a sorely neglected 
subject in the historiography. In recent years 
historians such as such as Andrew Iarocci 
and David Campbell have begun to re-examine 
training as a means of measuring and evaluating 
the learning curve.3 This paper builds on the 
work of previous scholars and extends some 
of their arguments while challenging others. 
It examines the training of the 12th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade for the battles of the Somme and 
Amiens, as well as the official training manuals, 
to look at tactical change over time. It argues 
that while combat became more complex and 
“all arms” oriented, the basic tactical concepts 
of 1916 essentially remained the same in 1918. 
Except for terminology and the addition of new 
weapons, little changed in how the 12th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade was taught to fight between the 
Somme and Amiens. Indeed, while new weapons 
were utilized and emphasized in training, they 
were merely integrated into existing tactical 
doctrine and had little appreciable impact on 
what was envisioned as the key to battlefield 
success. 
* * * * *
The Somme and Amiens are two entirely different battles – the Somme is generally 
considered to be the worst British failure in 
the First World War while Amiens is generally 
considered to be the Commonwealth’s greatest 
victory. Because these two battles are separated 
not only by time but also by outcome, they 
should, according to the “learning curve” 
paradigm, exist at either extreme of the process. 
However, there are some similarities. Both 
battles began in the summer and both were 
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offensive campaigns initiated by the British. 
While the Canadians arrived on the Somme two 
months after the campaign began, at Amiens 
they took part in the initial assault. In training 
for the Somme the Canadians had the benefit of 
learning from British experiences earlier in the 
campaign. Likewise, in preparing for Amiens 
the Canadians had the benefit of learning from 
British experiences in open warfare during the 
German Spring offensive of 1918. 
The first day of the Somme was a stereotypical 
battle of the Great War. On 1 July 1916 60,000 
British soldiers became casualties as they walked 
across no-man’s-land into a hail of machine gun 
bullets. While it was the quintessential battle 
of attrition which was waged, in fits and starts, 
until 19 November 1916,4 as the battle dragged 
on, soldiers generally were prepared for what 
they faced. Indeed, the 12th Brigade prepared 
thoroughly before arriving on the Somme. 
Above all, training emphasized initiative on 
the part of all soldiers (but especially NCOs 
and officers), a flexible approach to tactical 
problems and the preparation of all ranks for 
the unexpected.5  The training of the 12th Brigade 
was typical of Canadian preparations for the 
Somme and points to what Canadian and British 
commanders thought were the keys to victory.
Training in 1916 was not devoted simply to 
bayonet and musketry practice. Although these 
activities (as well as route marches), were still 
seen as important, they were used more to keep 
the basic skills of the soldier sharp rather than 
to “give him the keys to victory.” Instead, the 
training of a Canadian battalion for combat on 
the Somme was experiential in nature, utilizing 
practice attacks and tactical exercises to drive 
home the specific aspects of doctrine that it was 
thought would bring about success. The state of 
British doctrine in the summer of 1916 is best 
explained by an army publication of 8 May 1916, 
Stationary Service publication 109 [SS 109]: 
Training of Divisions for Offensive Action.6  
SS 109, written by Lieutenant-General L.E. 
Kiggell of British General Headquarters, posited 
several “new” ideas based on experience gained 
at the front in 1915 and suggested how these 
lessons learned in combat could be incorporated 
into the training of battalions. His suggestions 
played an important role in the training of the 
12th Canadian Infantry Brigade for the Somme. 
Kiggell emphasized the need to adequately prepare 
an attack, meaning the precise coordination of 
artillery bombardments with the advance of the 
infantry and the employment of predetermined 
tactical schemes designed to capture specific 
enemy strongpoints.7  More importantly, he 
suggested:
The conditions of every attack vary, and a special 
solution must be found for each individual 
problem.…It is impossible to lay down any 
definite rules as to the strength of assaulting 
columns, the number of lines of which they 
consist, or the distance apart of these lines. 
The depth of the assaulting column depends 
on the distance of the objective, and on the 
opposition that has to be overcome in reaching 
it. Its strength must be calculated so as to give 
sufficient driving power to enable the column 
to reach its objective to be held when gained.8 
Kiggel went on to speak to the importance of 
initiative at all levels of rank. He wrote,
special exercises should be held during the 
period of training by divisional and brigade 
commanders with all their staffs and subordinate 
Canadian soldiers training on the Salisbury
Plain in England march past Stonehenge
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commanders…to consider the action to be 
taken by subordinate commanders when local 
unexpected situations arise such as occur when a 
portion of a line is held up, impassable obstacles 
are encountered, or it becomes necessary to 
deliver or repel a local counter-attack.…Officers 
and men in action will usually do what they have 
been practiced to do or have been told to do in 
certain situations, and it is therefore all the more 
necessary to ensure that a clear understanding 
should exist amongst all ranks as to what 
action is to be taken in the different situations 
that may arise in battle…as …situations will 
constantly arise when there is no officer or 
non-commissioned officer present with groups 
of men, and the men must realize that, in such 
a case, one man must assume leadership on the 
spot and the remainder act under his control.9 
However, Kigell’s advice was not as original 
and ground-breaking as it may appear in the 
context of 1916. Indeed, these ideas (or at least 
their beginnings) can be found in the prewar 
training manuals which continued to be in force 
throughout the war.
 Contrary to the popular belief that the 
British used the same uniform attack formations 
universally across the Western Front, there was, 
at least officially, no universally accepted method 
of attack. The official training manual Infantry 
Training, 1914 stated: 
In no two military operations is the situation 
exactly similar. The character of the ground, 
the climatic conditions, the extent of the co-
operation of the other arms, the strength and 
fighting spirit of the opposing forces, their 
physical condition and the objects they wish to 
achieve must always differ.
It is impossible, therefore, as well as highly 
undesirable to lay down a fixed and unvarying 
system of battle formations. General principles 
and broad rules alone are applicable to the 
tactical handling of troops in war.10 
Likewise, another important official manual, 
Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations, 
read:
The conditions which affect the question of the 
frontage to be allotted to the various parts of an 
attacking force must vary with the circumstances 
of each battle. Ground, time conditions, the 
information available, the relative value of the 
opposing troops, the possibility of gaining a 
surprise, are some of the inconstant factors to 
be weighed. It is, therefore, neither possible nor 
desirable to give more than general indications as 
to how the problem is to be solved. The general 
principle is that the enemy must be engaged in 
sufficient strength to pin him to his ground and 
to wear down his power of resistance, while the 
force allotted to the decisive attack must be as 
strong as possible.11 
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From these excerpts we can see that Kigell’s SS 
109 echoed the prewar doctrine when it tasked 
the battalion commander to organize the soldiers 
under his command into the formation that 
would be most effective against the unique type 
of ground occupied by the enemy. Kigell also 
looked to the official Infantry Training, 1914 
when he emphasised the importance of initiative 
at all levels of rank. Infantry Training, 1914 
suggested that training should be designed “to 
give [the soldier] confidence in his superiors and 
comrades; to increase his powers of initiative, 
of self-confidence and of self-restraint; to train 
him to obey orders, or to act in the absence of 
orders for the advantage of his regiment under 
all conditions.”12 
 Essentially, this comparison between SS 109 
and the official prewar manuals suggests that 
there was at least as much continuity as change 
in official tactical doctrine between 1914 and 
1916: in 1916 Kiggell simply reinforced existing 
and accepted tactical principals. However, both 
the training manuals and SS 109 indicate official 
doctrine, not how that doctrine was interpreted 
in specific training exercises or at “the sharp end 
of the stick” because, as historian Paddy Griffith 
suggests, theory and practice in war are two 
entirely different things.13  Let us now examine 
how these doctrinal principals were interpreted 
in training by the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
 On 28 August 1916, before the 12th Brigade 
went into action on the Somme, the commanding 
officer of the brigade, accompanied by battalion 
commanders and several senior officers, 
attended a “demonstration of various trench 
warfare techniques” put on by the Second Army 
Central School of Instruction.14  The trench 
warfare demonstration was designed to be a state 
of the art example of how an attack on a realistic 
German position was to be carried out and how 
soldiers should be trained. The demonstration, 
as shown in the program given to attendees, 
emphasised ten key points:
a) Preparation for attack by bombardment by 2” 
and 9.45 cm Trench Mortars
b) Explosion of mine
c) Occupation of crater [created by the mine] 
under cover of:-
d) Barrage put on by Stokes Guns
e) Consolidation of Crater and enemy trenches
f) Smoke screen from Artillery Observation
g) Bombing and blocking of trenches
h) Installation of Snipers’ Posts
i) Intercommunication by aeroplane
j) Intercommunication by amplifier15 
The simulated attack was conducted in three 
waves. The first wave was to pass over the 
“enemy’s” main fire trench and take his support 
trench, some 100-200 yards beyond (see Map 1). 
The second wave was then to occupy the newly-
created crater and the enemy’s front line. A third 
wave would carry forward ammunition, bombs 
and supplies and aid in the consolidation of 
the two trenches. In this way the battlefield was 
divided into three zones of operation: the most 
forward zone containing the enemy’s support and 
communication trenches (labelled “C” and “D”), a 
middle zone consisting of the enemy’s main fire 
trench (labelled “B”) and a rearward area from 
which the attack was launched (labelled “A”). To 
capture and consolidate these positions specific 
tactical principles were to be observed.16 
 The “waves [were to] advance to [the] objective 
in parties of ten or less, in single file,” a type of 
formation which mirrors the small unit “shock 
troop” tactics of 1918.17  As well, in the attack, 
specialized squads and sections within the 
attacking force itself provided fire support for 
the assaulting infantry. The barrage, covering 
the advancing troops, was initially conducted by 
trench mortars which subsequently assumed 
a supporting role, moving forward with the 
infantry. The actual assault on the trenches was 
completed by the infantry, supported by bombers 
and Lewis Gunners.18  
 The assault itself was a highly coordinated 
effort. The first wave was composed of 125 
men, and was further subdivided into a series 
of groups, each with a specific task. The 50 men 
of Force “1” were assigned the task of taking the 
support trench and then reversing the parapet 
in anticipation of a counterattack. Forces “2” 
through “5” were to assist Force “1” in taking 
C trench and then each force was to split off 
and block the communications trenches at the 
following points marked on Map 1: D1, D2, 
D3 and D4. Force “5a” was to assist in taking 
C trench and then signal the airplanes that the 
objective was secured with flare guns. Forces “6” 
and “7” were to, again, assist in taking C trench 
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol14/iss4/3
19
and then break off from the main force and clear 
the communications trenches from point C.2 to 
the “new crater” and from point C.0 to the “old 
crater.” These last two forces would then link up 
with the second wave which had its attack broken 
down by objective in a similar manner.19  
 As the plan suggests, the success of the 
assault relied not on masses of men, marching 
in time towards an objective, but rather on the 
cooperation of small groups which were given 
specific and predetermined tasks. In this way, 
this simulated attack concentrated training 
on the same doctrinal points as had been 
emphasized in SS 109 and in the official pre-
war manuals. As well, we see evidence for what 
would later be called “small group tactics,” – 
the division of the assaulting force into several 
small and independent formations designed to 
work in concert towards a common objective. 
However, there is an underlying principal that is 
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A Canadian Lewis gunner fires 
at a German aircraft, July 1917
LAC PA 1416
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suggested by this demonstration that may not be 
immediately visible: fire and movement.
 While it is not explicitly stated, the success 
of the 28 August demonstration attack relied 
upon the fact that in order for infantry soldiers 
to attack a prepared position over open ground, 
the enemy needed to be prevented from “manning 
his parapet.” A tactical memorandum prepared 
by the General Officer Commanding XIV Corps, 
Lieutenant-General Cavan and dated 3 August 
1916 described how artillery fire could be used 
to cover the advance of the infantry under a 
“creeping barrage.”20  However, as subsequent 
exercises carried out by the 12th Brigade 
indicate, it was also recognized that soldiers in 
small groups needed to provide covering fire for 
each other.
 At the end of September the 12th Brigade 
began to train specifically for its upcoming 
deployment to the Somme front. During section 
and platoon training, while time was allotted for 
the men of the brigade to familiarize themselves 
with the newly-issued Lee-Enfield rifle in 
musketry practice,21  the main emphasis was on 
learning to move “in shallow columns [with] rapid 
deployment.”22  
 Because, the term “shallow columns” is used 
in the plural, it can be inferred that the platoon 
was to be divided into several small columns, 
each comprised of a single section of infantry, 
similar to the “single file lines” of ten or fewer 
soldiers demonstrated on 28 August 1916. 
These groups would utilize ground as cover far 
more efficiently than could men deployed in a 
horizontal line comprised of an entire platoon or 
company. These small groups could be controlled 
more efficiently than could a company of 120 men 
or a platoon of 40 men. This type of formation 
also necessitated that command and decision 
making power be delegated to the NCOs who 
were in command of sections and squads. As 
well, this type of deployment was much more 
effective against prepared positions.
 In instructions to the 38th Battalion, Brigadier-
General MacBrien wrote, “reserves should not be 
wasted in impossible frontal assaults against 
strong places but rather be thrown in between 
these strong places and [should] work around 
them to attack them in the flank and rear.”23  
MacBrien ordered that attention be given to 
the “avoidance of unnecessary losses owing to 
over crowding of trenches after the position has 
been consolidated. A system of defence with 
machine guns, Lewis guns and small parties of 
Infantry will usually suffice.”24  Furthermore, he 
instructed, “during these exercises the greatest 
importance is to be attached to the issuing of 
clear and concise orders…Each man should have 
a definite job, and understand it.”25  He suggested 
that assaulting formations “practice being held 
up at certain [enemy strong] points in the attack 
[and that] methods of communications with 
artillery [be practiced] with a view to having those 
points done in, and [the] reorganization of attack 
against these points.”26  These infantry attacks 
were to be combined with Lewis gun and Stokes 
Mortar teams, commanded at the battalion level 
and lower which incorporated into the attack in 
a supporting role.27  
 What MacBrien described are what would 
later be termed “infiltration” or “storm troop” 
tactics, that is, tactics which allowed small 
groups of infantry to penetrate the enemy’s main 
line, supported by other infantry and artillery, 
to attack enemy positions in their flanks.  These 
tactics, which would be referred to as “fire and 
movement” in the Second World War, required the 
advancing infantry to support itself: one group 
of infantry would fire in the general area of the 
enemy to “keep his head down” while a second 
group of infantry rushed forward. This “leap 
frog” process would eventually culminate in a 
close quarters battle decided by the bayonet, rifle 
butt, fists and the grenade. While historians such 
as Bruce Gudmundsson and Martin Samuels28  
(among many others) would suggest that these 
tactics were pioneered by the German army in 
1917 and 1918, they were in reality much older.
 The official training manual, Infantry 
Training, 1914 printed before the beginning of 
hostilities discusses the importance of fire and 
movement in the attack. It reads,
When the ground permits, it is generally 
necessary to detail special detachments of 
infantry to provide covering fire for the leading 
troops.…in flat country it is impossible for 
infantry or machine guns to fire over the heads 
of their own troops, and opportunities for 
supplying covering fire must be sought on the 
flanks. Troops detailed to give covering fire to 
others must take care to select as targets those 
7
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bodies of the enemy whose fire is chiefly checking 
the advance…As soon as their fire ceases to be 
effective in aiding the advance of the firing line, 
it is the duty of troops detailed to give covering 
fire at once to join in the advance.29 
Here the manual described the basic principals 
of fire and movement: fire is used to promote 
and enable movement. The attacking force was 
to be divided into an advancing unit and a fire-
unit.30  The duties of the fire-unit was to cover the 
forward movement of the assaulting unit. A 1915 
Canadian manual described how the process was 
designed to work,
When advancing line is checked, advance will 
be made by rushes. Proximity of enemy and 
formation of ground govern whether whole line 
simultaneously or portions of it alternately will 
advance. As a rule portions of line will advance 
alternately in rushes to successive halting places. 
Length of rush governed by enemy’s fire, physical 
condition of troops and available cover.…
Fire and Movement: Object of fire in attack and 
counter attack is to facilitate movement, check 
or hinder movements of enemy.31 
These manuals clearly placed emphasis on small 
unit tactics, which necessarily decentralised the 
command structure.32 These tactical units were 
expected to at least provide some of their own 
fire support through the use of trench mortars 
and Lewis Guns. The training of 12th Brigade 
suggests that these small groups were to close 
with the enemy through fire and movement. 
None of these concepts were either new or 
revolutionary: they are all taken directly from 
the prewar field manuals. The basic tactical 
principals laid down in the official training 
literature remained consistent between the 
outbreak of war and the Battle of the Somme. 
Indeed, as we shall see, this continuity in tactical 
doctrine extended to 1918.
* * * * *
During the spring of 1918, the Canadian Corps missed the main thrust of the biggest 
German offensive since 1914. Because the 
Canadians were largely unbloodied, they were 
chosen, along with the ANZACs, to lead the first 
major Allied counteroffensive in mid-summer 
1918. While the Battle of Amiens would prove 
to be a major Allied victory and would be 
remembered by Eric Luddendorf as “the black 
day of the German Army,” the victory was not 
the product of new tactical principals. Instead, 
as training records demonstrate, the tactics used 
at Amiens were essentially the same as those 
suggested by the official prewar manuals. As well, 
specific tactical training differed little between the 
battles of the Somme and Amiens.
Training for what would eventually become 
the Llandovery Castle operation began in mid-
spring 1918.33  Like at the Somme, a series of 
exercises were set for the 12th Brigade which 
were designed to teach tactical concepts. On 6 
May 1918, MacBrien issued “‘Delta’ Training 
Instruction No 1.” MacBrien wrote, “Owing to the 
fact that the Division will have only a few days 
to train – (possibly 7) – it is essential that every 
available hour be fully occupied in the training of 
officers, NCOs and men.”34  Faced with a limited 
period of training, it is interesting to note the 
activities which were emphasized. MacBrien 
wrote:
 In training particular attention should be paid 
to the following:-
a) Day and night marching by compass 
bearings (officers and NCOs).
b) Scouting and patrolling.
c) Rapid communications (keeping in touch 
with flanks).
d) Musketry (to be carried out with fixed 
bayonets):- Rapid fire, fire orders, fire 
direction, fire control and description of 
targets.
e) Physical training and bayonet fighting.
f) The training of specialists – such as Lewis 
Gunners and Rifle Grenadiers.…
g) Sections to be practiced in approaching 
an imaginary strong pint, making use of 
hedges, ditches, and other cover.
h) Platoons moving in Section columns 
opening to line in extended order. Sections 
advancing under supporting fire of other 
sections.35 
These specific “areas of concentration” were not 
groundbreaking by any means. Indeed, bayonet 
fighting, night marching, scouting, patrolling, 
musketry and physical training were the most 
basic elements of infantry training.36 However, 
once the “basic” training described above was 
completed, the 12th Brigade began to practice 
attacks at the company level.
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 MacBrien’s instructions 
set out just how these practice 
attacks were to be carried 
out and what points were to 
be emphasised. In the same 
instruction noted above he 
continued,
When platoons have received 
a brushing up in 4h [refers 
to the list above] a simple 
tactical scheme for the attack 
of a company should be carried 
out. The attack could be made 
on a farmhouse, or two of 
them, which would represent 
enemy strong points. If ground 
is suitable attacks should 
start from five hundred yards 
from the objective. In these 
schemes attention should be 
paid to the action of the Lewis 
Guns – the use of cover – 
initiative of platoon and section 
commanders in pushing forward – fire orders 
– action of rifle grenadiers.…Platoon must be 
practiced in capturing strong points and Machine 
Gun positions alone – and in co-operation 
with platoons on the flanks. Companies are to 
be exercised in clearing up areas containing 
several hostile localities. Smoke bombs should 
be used.37 
The points emphasized in this brief training 
syllabus are almost identical to those points 
highlighted in both the prewar manuals and 
the exercises carried out in preparation for the 
Somme. Units were expected to attack in small 
groups and operate as sections, not platoons 
or companies. Initiative at all levels of rank 
was emphasized and the importance of using 
ground and cover in the advance was underlined. 
Basically there seems to be little difference 
between this practice attack and the exercises 
carried out in August and September of 1916. 
This is also true for training carried out later in 
the summer by 12th Brigade.
 The most detailed training exercise conducted 
by the 12th Brigade took place on 5 July 1918. 
The instructions issued for the attack read:
Plan of action
I.  OC divides the area into 3 zones and 
disposes his trops as under:-
“C” Company [Coy] to clear OUTPOST 
ZONE…
“B” Coy to clear BATTLE ZONE…
“A” and “D” Coy to clear REAR ZONE…
II. 3” Trench Mortars [TM] to follow “B”, “A” and 
Left:  A Canadian soldier practices his 
musketry skills, June 1916.
Below: Testing a Vickers Machine 
Gun, September 1916
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“D” Coys, and give assistance as required.
III. 6” TMs will be kept as a Battalion reserve 
and employed on request for assistance 
from companies.
IV. 1 Section Canadian Field Artillery to operate 
in area and render assistance by direct 
and indirect fire as required by the Bn. 
Commander according to situation which 
may develop.
V. Battery of Machine Guns: 1 section on 
Slag heep (C.15.a) to deliver covering fire. 
1 section to follow infantry to assist with 
covering fire and to help hold ground 
gained.
VI. 1 Section of Tanks: Held as a reserve in the 
first instance owing to the limited number 
available, to go forward and deal with points 
of opposition which arise.
VII. Aeroplane: A) to carry 
out a reconnaissance and try to 
find centres of resistance, dropping 
bombs on them. B) report progress 
of out most advanced troops from 
ground flares.38 
This is an almost identical 
exercise to that carried out on 28 
August 1916 in both form and 
substance. The division of the 
attack’s objectives into three zones 
(see Map 2) was quite similar to 
the scheme laid out in Map 1. As 
on 28 August, the three zones were 
to be cleared in a “reverse leap 
frog” fashion where the farthest 
objective was to be secured first. 
The use of trench mortars to 
assist in the advance, under 
the command of the assaulting 
infantry, was exactly the same as 
the previous exercise. The use 
of the Canadian Field Artillery 
section was in accordance with 
the suggestions made by Caven 
in the summer of 1916. Likewise, 
the use of machine guns to provide 
covering fire was in accordance 
with the provisions of the prewar 
field manuals discussed above. 
The only major difference between 
the 1916 attack and the 1918 
attack was the use of tanks and 
airplanes in offensive roles.
 In reality, tanks were not in 
use on the Western Front when 
the 1916 demonstration attack 
occurred. Airplanes were likewise 
not generally able to operate in 
an offensive role. By 1918, both 
had become commonplace on the 
field of battle. However, while their 
use in 1918 may appear to have 
been innovative, they were actually 
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employed in a conventional manner, meaning that 
these new weapons were merely integrated into 
the existing tactical doctrine. In many ways, tanks 
and airplanes were used as mobile artillery. 
 If we look back to the training conducted in 
1916, we see that the role of the artillery was, after 
the initial barrage, to assist the infantry in dealing 
with strongpoints.39  Indeed, this was still the role 
of the artillery in 1918 (at least according to 12th 
Brigade’s Tactical Scheme No.3). Here we see that 
tanks were to be used sparingly and only to deal 
with strongpoints. As well, airplanes were to drop 
bombs to destroy strongpoints. Basically, while 
the weapons delivery system may be different in 
1918 than in 1916, the tactical principal guiding 
the employment of that weapon remained the 
same throughout: infantry were used to advance 
and occupy ground; artillery, tanks and airplanes 
were used to assist and support the infantry by 
dealing with strong points.
 The concepts that MacBrien hoped to teach 
his soldiers in 1918 were remarkably similar to 
the concepts that he emphasized in 1916. The 
instructions read,
Lessons which it is desired that the exercise 
should teach
1. The method of overcoming Machine Gun 
Defence in depth:
a. Initiative on the part of platoons 
in making use of the ground and in 
working forward on the flanks of the enemy 
positions.
b. Infiltration.
c. Close Liaison.…
First Phase:
a) Platoon tactics in capturing any points 
of resistance left in the enemy’s outpost 
zone after our preparatory bombardment 
has ceased. Normally this zone is lightly 
held but it is necessary to provide for the 
capture of whatever may live through out 
bombardment.
b) Re-bombardment of some points 
in outpost zone may be necessary but in 
this scheme it is taken for granted that the 
infantry does not require further assistance 
but overcomes the opposition met with by 
its own weapons.
Second Phase
c) Shows the Coy and Platoon tactics in 
manoeuvring to outflank and destroy the 
enemy positions after having penetrated 
where possible into his battle zone, 
enfiltration being used
d) Both Artillery and Trench Mortars 
will be moved forward to fire as necessary 
to overceom oppostion in this zone
Third Phase
e) Shows Battalion tactics in dealing 
Canadians advancing east of 
Arras, September 1918.
LAC PA 3074
11
Humphries: Myth of the Learning Curve
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2005
26
with the enemy in the “rear zone”. Coys 
give mutual support to one another in the 
advance. Platoons engage hostile machine 
gun nests with fire. Platoons will work 
forward on both flanks before the advance 
in the centre commences.40
These “lessons” are almost identical to the 
discussion of fire an movement offered above. 
Indeed, in 1916 these concepts were more 
defined and were discussed in more depth. 
 Before the Somme MacBrien suggested that 
troops not be wasted in “impossible frontal 
assaults against strong places but rather be 
thrown in between these strong places and work 
around them to attack them in the flank and 
rear.”41 While the actual term “infiltration” (or 
enfiltration) is used in 1918, the concept remains 
the same as discussed in 1916 and in the pre-
war field manuals. Likewise, “Close Liaison” is 
merely a new term applied to a concept discussed 
in 1916 and in the prewar field manuals: the 
use of artillery (and in 1918 tanks and aircraft) 
to deal with enemy strongpoints.42  The use of 
platoon tactics and the focus of the attack on the 
flanks of the enemy, has already been discussed 
in some detail both in reference to the prewar 
field manuals and training conducted in 1916. 
However, it is important to stress that this was 
not a new idea: not in 1918 and not in 1916. This 
point gets at the heart of the matter.
 In Shock Army of the British Empire Shane 
Schreiber writes, 
the battle of Amiens was not only the beginning 
of the end for the German Army on the Western 
Front, but also the culmination of technological 
and tactical changes that foreshadowed the 
development of modern mechanized warfare.… 
The British, Australian and Canadian triumph 
at Amiens was in fact a story of technological 
innovation, tactical metamorphosis and careful, 
detailed planning and orchestration that acted 
as a harbinger of the sea change [sic] that had 
taken place in modern European land warfare 
during 1917 and 1918.43
Canadian troops with a tank 
move across no-man’s-land.
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But where is the evidence that such a change 
took place?
 Schreiber writes,
[In the winter of 1918, Canadian] infantry units 
continued to incorporate innovative platoon 
level tactics into their training, borrowing much 
from German “stormtroop tactics” and from 
innovations made by others in the British and 
French armies, such as Ivor Maxse. This tactical 
system focused on small, independent groups of 
about 40 soldiers fighting their way to a specific 
objective using dispersed formations, the terrain, 
support fire and movement to their advantage. 
Fire support came in the form of Lewis light 
machine guns and other light support weapons, 
such as grenades and light mortars. Gone were 
the days when waves of infantry charged into a 
hail of machine gun fire, replaced instead with 
carefully planned, short, sharp dashes under the 
cover of vicious, close-range supporting fire.44 
As we have seen, not only did these tactical 
principles exist in 1916, they are also clearly 
described in the prewar manuals. Fire and 
movement was not new and neither was the 
use of light and heavy automatic weapons for 
covering fire.45  The decentralization of command, 
necessary for small group tactics, was called 
for in the prewar manuals and the use of small 
groups of men, working in alternate rushes, 
utilizing terrain as cover was clearly important, 
both before the war and during training in 1916.46  
How then are we to account for this discrepancy, 
as Schreiber is only one among many historians 
who make similar arguments?47 
 While it is true that tens of thousands of 
British soldiers died on 1 July 1916 on the 
Somme, killed by a sleet of machine gun bullets, 
it is also true that the Allied armies broke the 
German army in the summer and fall of 1918 
forcing Ludendorff to call for an armistice on 11 
November 1918. Historians, who are trained to 
look for “change over time” and then describe 
the causal agent behind that change, necessarily 
have tried to explain why Allied fortunes altered 
so dramatically between 1916 and 1918. The 
prevalent Canadian historiography assigns 
causality to the “learning curve.” 
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 Much of the Canadian historiography is 
steeped in nationalism and, ultimately, seeks 
to prove that the Canadian Corps was the 
“best” Allied formation on the western front. 
Naturally the myth follows the archetypal hero 
story: the Corps, a rag tag bunch of citizen 
soldiers, struggles against the inflexible and 
conservative regular British Army structure, until 
the Canadians are able to come into their own 
(despite the cards stacked against them) at Vimy 
Ridge and, in doing so, they secure their place at 
the front of the 1918 Victory winning offensive 
which brings Canada acclaim and the right to 
call itself a country separate from Great Britain. 
Because the Canadian First World War myth is 
essentially about the child (Canada) coming to 
the rescue of the parent (Great Britain), central 
to the mechanics of the story is the suggestion 
that Canada, and not Great Britain, overcame 
the riddle of the trenches. Naturally, this myth 
focuses on Sir Arthur Currie, the Canadian Corps 
Commander who led the Canadians after Vimy 
Ridge until the end of the war. This myth suggests 
that it was under Currie’s leadership that the 
Canadian Corps became the “shock army” of the 
British Empire. While Currie was an able and 
effective Corps Commander, perhaps it is time to 
look beyond the Canadian myth to explain what 
changed on the Western Front between 1914 and 
1918. Perhaps the answer is far more simple than 
it seems.
 Historians, concerned with change, causative 
agents and the capacity of individuals to affect the 
course of history, often look beyond the mundane 
forces that operate beneath the surface. What is 
clear from the above evidence is that continuity 
in tactics and training was as notable as change. 
However, there was a deadlock on the Western 
Front. Indeed, it is often assumed that this 
deadlock was the result of a breakdown and 
failure in tactical thinking. However, it could be 
argued that the same tactics that historians argue 
“broke down” in 1914 are hailed as “innovative” 
and the “keys to victory” in 1918.
 Perhaps it is true that tactics designed to 
utilize fire, movement and the enemy’s flanks 
were simply useless against a strong enemy 
without assailable flanks from 1914 to 1917. 
However, by 1918 many other factors were at 
work: the German army had been stretched thin 
and then failed in its own attempt to “solve the 
riddle of the trenches” in the spring of 1918. 
This exacerbated the already significant problem 
brought about by four years of attritional warfare: 
by the summer of 1918 it was apparent that in 
only a matter of months, there would simply be no 
more Germans to “man the parapet.” Weakened 
by blockade and drawing on an ever smaller 
resource and manpower pool, the German army 
was, in 1918, not able to offer the same level of 
resistance as it had earlier in the war. By 1918 
Canadians enter the main square in Cambrai, France during the advance east of Arras, October 1918.
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the German army had also resorted to a system 
of defence-in-depth, which some historians have 
argued was a tactical breakthrough,48  but was 
really based on a need to economize defence over 
greater distances. Because prewar and mid-war 
Allied tactics were designed to attack an enemy 
in his flanks, overcoming strongpoints using 
small groups of self-supported infantry, this 
system may have simply played into Allied hands: 
suddenly the Germans, deployed in a network of 
strongpoints, had flanks to attack. This helps to 
explain why an examinaiton of the training of the 
12th Canadian Infantry Brigade between 1916 
and 1918 suggests that there was at least as much 
continuity as change in the tactics emphasized 
during training. Clearly, future case studies of 
training must be done to confirm whether this 
was a more generalized phenominum.
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